Is Reparation Unfair?

Written by Joel Ballivian

Fibonacci Blue from Minnesota, USA, CC BY 2.0

Introduction

We are witnessing a revival of interest in reparations for historic injustice. In the U.S., for example, calls to address the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow apartheid are gaining momentum, with Ta-Nehisi Coates' 2014 article, "The Case for Reparations," playing a significant role. Reparative efforts are already underway locally and at the state level (such as in Evanston, IL, and California). Numerous presidential candidates have endorsed reparation as part of their policy agenda. In fact, support for reparation can be found across the partisan divide, among conservatives, moderates, and liberals alike. Ultimately, reparationists have their eye set on a program of national repair.

What is reparation? Roughly, reparation is the effort of an individual or institution to repair an injustice by offering some form of compensation to the aggrieved, acknowledging wrongs committed, and holding culpable institutions accountable through reform and truth-telling. Programs of this sort have been implemented in places outside the U.S., such as Germany’s payments to victims of the Holocaust and South Africa’s payments to victims of apartheid. A few antecedents exist in the U.S. as well, including reparation to victims of Japanese internment during World War II, as well as reparations to victims of the 1923 anti-Black riot that destroyed Rosewood, a predominantly Black town on the Gulf Coast of Florida. In recent times, the city of Evanston, IL, agreed to set aside the first $10 million in tax revenue from cannabis sales to finance homeownership and other forms of economic development for Black residents whose ancestors were impacted by historic housing discrimination. Reparations for land theft and genocide against indigenous Americans have a fraught history, with ongoing battles over land disputes and recognition of sovereignty.

Is reparation justified? To hone the discussion, consider the case for economic reparation to African Americans. The argument often begins with a look at the enduring legacy of past wrongs. African Americans have endured numerous past injustices, including systemic and state-sanctioned wrongs such as slavery, apartheid segregation, voter suppression, civil rights denial, exclusion from wealth-building opportunities, extralegal (and usually violent) policing, lynching, inadequate investments into Black schools and neighborhoods, exploitative work conditions after emancipation, violence and pushback in response to Black empowerment, nation-wide housing discrimination, and the persistent failure on the part of the government to implement reparation immediately after these wrongs. 

A strong case can be made that these injustices produced present-day disparities and setbacks, including massive disparities in wealth and upward mobility, high levels of present-day racial segregation, the concentration of Black Americans in economically vulnerable urban areas, unequal job opportunities, educational disparities and under-investment in Black school districts, over-policing and higher incarceration rates in Black communities, and so on. Past injustices leave present wounds.

An objection

Despite these arguments, skepticism persists. While various objections have been raised against reparation, there is one that dominates the discussion. I devote the rest of this essay to evaluating it. The objection begins with the observation that no present-day citizens are at fault for past wrongs. For example, no one alive today was present during the time of slavery. Moreover, Jim Crow segregation ended in the 1960s, meaning that few of the people responsible for defending it are alive. According to skeptics, what follows is that, “the vast majority of people who would shoulder the financial burden of reparations are people who had nothing to do with either slavery or the century of discriminatory policies that followed.” How can anyone be expected to pay for wrongs they did not commit? Economist Walter E. Williams expresses the objection like this: “If the government got the money [for reparations] from the tooth fairy or Santa Claus, that'd be great. But the government has to take the money from citizens, and there are no citizens alive today who were responsible for slavery.”

Although the objection is initially appealing, advocates of reparation can offer various responses. 

Responses

First, reparationists have long argued that government institutions (federal or state) bear fault for past wrongs. The blame is not placed on any present-day individuals. For example, the federal government sanctioned slavery, Jim Crow, and aggressively pursued discriminatory housing policies throughout the 20th century. Hence, our political institutions bear the responsibility to make reparations. 

“Reparation is not about ‘punishing’ any present-day citizens, whether taxpayers or descendants of those who were complicit in historic wrongs. Rather, reparation holds national institutions responsible for wrongdoings and keeps these institutions accountable to the ideals of equality and justice”

This nuance implies two things. First, reparation is not about “punishing” any present-day citizens, whether taxpayers or descendants of those who were complicit in historic wrongs. Rather, reparation holds national institutions responsible for wrongdoings and keeps these institutions accountable to the ideals of equality and justice. Second, no individual is made personally liable for the cost. To illustrate, no person will be forced to write a “reparation check.” In fact, reparation does not even require a special reparation tax. As with most national expenditures, incorporating reparation in the national budget may require re-budgeting or debt financing. But the point is that the responsibility to pay belongs to the government.

By keeping the distinction between individual responsibility and institutional responsibility in mind, we can more easily see the flaw in the objection. While none of the individual wrongdoers from the days of slavery are around, the institutional wrongdoers are. Reparation neither blames present-day individuals nor expects them to assume personal responsibility for the cost. The responsibility, including making payments and investments, falls to government institutions.

In response, people quickly push back by re-asserting the key claim of the objection: “but the government must get the money for reparation from someone. Ultimately, taxpayers will shoulder the financial cost of reparation.” Even if the claim is true, it is hard to see how it poses a challenge for reparation.

First, taxpayers shoulder the financial cost of nearly all national expenditures. Expenditures on education, defense, national debt, the construction of new bridges and roads, and so on, are largely financed by taxpayer dollars (in addition to some debt financing). Unless you think taxation is generally unjust (a discussion for a different time), why is it problematic to use taxes for reparation but not so for these other national expenditures? The response can’t be, “because I’m not at fault for the debt of reparations; I didn’t commit the relevant injustices.” That response fails because you aren’t at fault for most other national debts or expenditures. In obvious cases where the use of taxes is just, the presence of fault is irrelevant.

This point leads to a dilemma. If you think reparation is questionable because taxpayers are faultless, consistency may require that you argue the same about any national expenditure for which they are faultless. This would lead to some rather implausible conclusions. Neither you or I are at fault for why anyone ages out of the workforce, yet we do not argue that the government wrongs us by using our taxes to finance pensions. Most of us are not at fault for debts created by past generations, yet we do not argue that we are wronged when the government uses our taxes to pay these national debts. Most of us recognize that paying off national debts and expenditures is a national responsibility and that our taxes ought to go toward these debts, whether or not we are at fault. Supposing reparation is a national debt, as reparationists argue, why do we treat it so differently? 

Second, I suspect reparation skeptics harbor a misunderstanding about what it means when their taxes are used to finance reparation. Many seem to assume they are being held personally liable for the payment. To illustrate, suppose a judge orders you to pay Ava’s medical bills. In that case, you are being held personally liable for the bill. Loosely put, the bill “belongs” to you, and you must pay it under threat of legal sanction. If reparation holds taxpayers personally liable for repair, then perhaps skeptics have a point against reparation. To illustrate, imagine a judge forces you to pay compensation, out-of-pocket, to a random victim of a robbery. You have been legally forced to assume personal responsibility for something you did not do. There is something morally objectionable about the judge’s orders. 

“The responsibility is institutional, not individual.”

The problem is that the government’s use of taxes for some expenditure does not amount to treating taxpayers personally liable for the expenditure. Return to the various examples of national expenditures financed with taxpayer money. In none of these cases are taxpayers treated personally responsible for the payments. For example, none of us imagine we are being forced to write personal checks to retired citizens, even though the government uses our taxes to finance retirement pensions. We recognize that the bill belongs to the government. The responsibility is institutional, not individual. 

These considerations invite us to reframe the issue. Reparation is unlike the case of the judge who orders you to pay the victim. Instead, paying into reparation is more like paying a fee as part of one’s membership in an insurance group. If you are a member of an insurance group, some of your money will go toward insurance payouts, but this does not make you personally responsible for those payments. Just imagine Ava is a member of an insurance agency and endures a compensable injury. Beatrice, who is also a member, objects to the situation: “none of us are at fault for Ava’s injury.” The objection should strike us as puzzling. No member’s guilt is necessary for the justice of compensating Ava. Beatrice might press the point further: “my membership fees are used to compensate Ava." The objection is still puzzling. It appears rooted in a misunderstanding of some sort. Perhaps Beatrice thinks it would be wrong to make her personally liable for Ava’s medical bills. If so, she would be right. But it is clear that she is not being held personally liable, even though some of her fees pay for the bill. The insurance agency bears the responsibility to pay; members bear the responsibility to pay fees. There is no presumption of guilt or personal responsibility here. To insist that members are nevertheless “paying the bill” comes with a cost: in that sense of “paying the bill,” members pay, but no one recognizes that as a morally objectionable sense of “paying the bill.” What would be objectionable is if they had to pay the bill in the sense of being personally liable for it. But that is not the case in the insurance example. Neither is it the case with reparation. 

We tend to recognize that paying members are not held personally liable for expenses such as insurance payouts or retirement pensions. Reparationists invite us to see reparation in the same light: the government is responsible for paying reparation; citizens are responsible for paying taxes to the government. It’s nothing personal. 

Finally, arguing that reparation is unfair because, “taxpayers are innocent,” often turns on a failure to appreciate the difference between the responsibilities of citizens, on the one hand, and the responsibilities of wrongdoers, on the other. If Sal maliciously throws a rock through your window, she has a responsibility to compensate you. That is her responsibility as a wrongdoer. If Sam is a citizen of the U.S., on the other hand, reaping various of its benefits and protections, she has a responsibility to give back to her country. Paying taxes is part of this give-back responsibility. The responsibility is not rooted in any wrongdoing she has committed. It is rooted in her status as a citizen. Because of this, some of her taxes can be used legitimately for various national debts and expenditures. If she wasn’t alive when one of these debts was created, or if she immigrated after these debts were created, so what? She is a citizen, and citizens have the responsibility to pay taxes. 

“Reparation therefore does not ask innocent taxpayers to do the government’s job (personally paying for national expenditures). It simply assumes citizens will keep paying taxes – a responsibility rooted in citizenship, not guilt. ”

The distinction between the responsibilities of citizens and the responsibilities of governments helps clarify the point being made throughout this essay. Governments are responsible for paying national expenditures, including reparative ones. Citizens are responsible for financing expenditures. Again, it is nothing personal. Reparation therefore does not ask innocent taxpayers to do the government’s job (personally paying for national expenditures). It simply assumes citizens will keep paying taxes––a responsibility rooted in citizenship, not guilt. 

Conclusion

In summary, present-day citizens may not be guilty of historic injustices, but they are citizens of a country whose political institutions committed numerous historic wrongs against African Americans. If the government owes repairs, present-day citizens will help with some of the cost. This is not a matter of personal guilt. It is simply a duty that comes with citizenship and follows from the right of democratic governments to require their citizens to pay taxes. Citizenship makes us responsible to bear a fair share, not just of reparative debts, but of any national debt, whether or not we are at fault. 

We all inherit a world wounded by historic injustice. As reparationists argue, a program of repair is due. I have not attempted to defend this claim in full. My goal was simply to cast some doubt on the popular objection that reparation is morally questionable because “no one alive is at fault." If there is anything questionable going on here, it may be in the act of excusing ourselves from supporting reparation on the ground that “we didn’t do it.”

Recommended reading

Darity, W. and Kirsten, M (2020). From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the 21st Century (University of North Carolina Press).

Fullinwider, Robert K. (2000). ‘The Case for Reparations’. Report From the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy 20 (2):1-8.

Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Harvard University Press. 

Rothstein, R. (2017). The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (Liveright Publishing Corporation).